Abstract: This paper provides a synoptic outline of convergent trends in state formation in western and eastern Eurasia from the early first millennium BCE to the mid-first millennium CE and considers the problem of subsequent divergence.
Twin empires?
Two thousand years ago, perhaps half of the entire human species had come under the control of just two powers, the Roman and Han empires at opposite ends of the Eurasia. Both entities were broadly similar in terms of size.
1 Both of them were run by god-like emperors residing in the largest cities the world had seen so far; both states were made up of some 1,500 to 2,000 administrative districts and, at least at times, employed hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Both states laid claim to ruling the whole world, orbis terrarum and tianxia, while both encountered similar competition for surplus between central government and local elites, similar pressures generated by secondary state formation beyond their frontiers and subsequent 'barbarian' infiltration, and both of them even ended in similar ways: One half, the original political core -the west in Europe, the north in China -, was first weakened by warlordism and then taken over by 'barbarian' successor states, whereas the other half was maintained by a traditionalist regime. It was only from the late sixth century CE onward that the two trajectories of state formation began to diverge, slowly at first but more dramatically over time, between the cyclical restoration of a China-wide empire in the East and the decline of empire and central government in the West, followed by the slow creation of a polycentric state system that proved resistant to any attempts to impose hegemony, let alone unification, and ultimately evolved into the now-familiar cluster of modern nation states. In terms of state size, state capacity, and state institutions, we observe a prolonged process of gradual convergence that lasted for many centuries but was eventually replaced by a process of increasing divergence that continued into the early twentieth century. I will argue that this allows us to speak of a 'Great Convergence' that spanned the entire first millennium BCE and the first half of the first millennium CE, until a '(First) Great Divergence' began to unfold from about the sixth century CE onward. 
Environment
As far as the ecological context is concerned, both imperial entities shared the fundamental requirement of being located within the temperate zone of Eurasia that thanks to its climate, flora and fauna had long favored the development of social complexity and large polities. 3 The two empires also had in common a division into two different ecological spheres: in the case of Rome, a Mediterranean core and a continental European northern periphery, and in the case of China a loess and river plain core and a hotter and wetter southern periphery. In both cases, albeit well after the end of antiquity, the locus of development eventually shifted into these former peripheries. However, the environment also accounted for substantial differences, most notably the fact that the Roman empire centered on a temperate sea core that was highly conducive to communication, the transfer of goods and people, and the projection of power, whereas China consists of river valleys that are separated by mountain ranges and, at least prior to the creation of ambitious canal systems from the sixth century CE onwards, posed far greater physical obstacles to integration. Moreover, whereas the main western rivers such as Rhône, Rhine, Danube, and Nile converge upon the inner sea core, Chinese rivers all flow eastward, thereby reinforcing regional separation. In view of these differences, one might suspect that ceteris 1 Both empires controlled approximately 4 million square kilometers of territory. The Han census of 2 CE recorded 59.6 million individuals. Lower census tallies of between 47.6 and 56.5 million during the second century CE are probably marred by higher levels of underregistration (Bielenstein 1987: 12) . The Roman imperial population may have grown to around 65 to 75 million by the mid-second century CE (Scheidel 2007: 48) , but this is just a rough estimate and an even higher total cannot be ruled out. Recent guesses concerning the total number of humans in the first two centuries CE range from 170 to 330 million (Cohen 1995: 400) . 2 I refer to this process as the 'First Great Divergence' in order to distinguish it from the better-established (Second) 'Great Divergence', a moniker that Pomeranz 2000 applied to the technological and economic expansion of the 'West' during the last two centuries. 3 Diamond 2005. paribus, western Eurasia was more likely to end up politically united than its eastern counterpart. On the other hand, China is more compact (in terms of the ratio of surface area to border length) and selfcontained, well shielded by mountains and sea on three sides, and open only to the arid Central Asian steppe. By contrast, the temperate ecumene in western Eurasia extends twice as far west-east from the Atlantic into eastern Iran, and is endowed with a much more permeable frontier to the northeast that used to faciliate movement by agriculturalists and nomads alike. We must ask whether and to what extent these contrasting features help account for the fact that while the Chinese 'core' (conservatively defined as the region controlled by the Qin empire at the time of its maximum extension in 214 BCE) was united for 936 of the past 2,220 years, or 42 per cent of the time, the corresponding tally for the section of the western ecumene that was under Roman rule at the death of Augustus in 14 CE is perhaps three and half centuries, or merely 18 per cent of the past 1,998 years. 4 More importantly, for the past sixteen centuries, the latter score has been exactly zero. Only the Umayyad empire ever managed to stretch all the way from the Atlantic to the Indus, and that only for some forty years.
Parallels
Both the Roman and Qin-Han empires were built on templates provided by antecedent states and expanded into a widening ecumene: in the West, from the river cultures of the Middle East into the Mediterranean and on to continental Europe, in the East from the Wei and middle Yellow River valleys into the Central Plain and then on to the south. In the East, the basic context had been created by the Shang-Western Zhou polities (c.1600-771 BCE) and their dominant elite culture and the spread of the Western Zhou garrison cities across the Central Plain region. In the Mediterranean, this role had been performed by the spread of Greek settlements across the Mediterranean littoral (from the eighth century BCE) and the cultural Hellenization of autonomous local elites.
Back in 1994, Christian Gizewski proposed a useful nine-phase parallel model of the development of the Qin-Han and the Roman states which, somewhat modified, can be used to illustrate the striking degree of parallel movements at the most basic level of state formation. 5 The first stage (down to about 500 BCE) witnessed the creation of polities at the western margins of a much wider ecumene, a positioning that favored a focus on military capability, in both Rome and Qin. The main difference was that whereas Qin was already tied into a wider state system, the feudal network of Western Zhou, Rome, farther removed from the 'Great Powers' of the Levant, was autonomous and embedded only in regional city state clusters (Latins and Etruscans). At the second stage in the fifth and into the fourth centuries BCE, both entities grew into autonomous middling powers and experienced conflict with comparable competitors: within central Italy in the case of Rome, and in the 'land within the passes' (Guanzhong) in the case of Qin. Both polities continued to retain their independence because they were physically shielded from 'Great Power' conflicts in more developed regions farther east. Making the most of their 'marcher state advantage', this allowed them to accumulate military capabilities without encountering the superior absorptive capacity of more powerful states. The third phase resulted in hegemonic power over a large sector of the ecumene in the fourth and early third centuries BCE, all over Italy for Rome and expansion into Sichuan in the case of Qin. Once again, this growth occurred without triggering major conflict with the leading powers of their respective koine but nevertheless brought it closer, due to encroachment on the Greeks in Italy and on the kingdom of Wei in China. Both Rome and Qin benefited from low protection costs thanks to strong natural borders, the sea and Alps in Italy and mountain ranges in Qin and Sichuan. Successful expansion strengthened Rome's aristocratic collective leadership and Qin's monarchy: this difference in regime type will be considered below. The fourth step brought hegemony over the entire core ecumene in a series of highstakes wars, in the third through first centuries BCE in Rome and in a more compressed format in the third century BCE in China. In both cases, hegemony preceded direct rule, although the protobureaucratization of Qin facilitated more rapid annexation than the much more limited administrative capabilities of the oligarchic regime in Rome. In both cases, large-scale conquest triggered violent adjustment processes: in the East, a shift from the 'war-machine' state of Qin to the less overtly centralized regime of the early Han, and in the West a more protracted transition that replaced the established oligarchy with a military monarchy. Owing to the more profound character of this latter shift, conflict in Rome was more sustained, but in both cases the result was the same: a monarchy with, at least at first, strong aristocratic participation.
The fifth stage, in the first two centuries CE in Rome and from the second century BCE to the second century CE in Han, was characterized by slowing expansion and internal homogenization. In both cases, we witness the strengthening of powerful local elites that cooperated with the state but also constrained its range of action. This process was interrupted in Phase 6 by warlordism and temporary fragmentation in the third century CE, a crisis that was more readily contained by the professional military of the Roman empire than by the warlords of Three Kingdoms China. The seventh phase of attempted restoration was much more prolonged and at least temporarily successful in Rome than in the internally riven state of Jin China but in both cases ended in barbarian conquest, from the early fourth century CE in northern China and from the early fifth century CE in the western Roman empire. The subsequent Phase 8 saw the already-mentioned division into rump states in the Roman East and the Chinese South and 'barbarian' successor states closer to the northern frontiers. In both cases, conquerors increasingly merged with local elites, and in both cases transcendent religions that claimed autonomy from the state -Christianity and Buddhism -made considerable progress. Sixth-century CE attempts at re-unification were more successful in China than in the Mediterranean. However, it was only afterwards, in Phase 9, that developments finally diverged sharply, between the Tang consolidation in the East and the near-destruction of the East Roman or 'Byzantine' state by Persians and Arabs and the subsequent political fragmentation of both the Islamic and the Frankish successor states, a process that was particularly prolonged and intense in western Europe. These developments mark the onset of the 'First Great Divergence' that led to the creation of the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing empires in China, culminating in the current People's Republic, and to the gradual entrechment of state polycentrism in Europe.
Convergence
Convergent trends in state formation were not lastingly impeded by substantial initial differences in regime type and state organization. The most obvious difference between Rome and China lies in the increasing centralization of the Warring States period that created stronger state structures than anywhere in Europe prior to the modern period.
6 Put in the most general terms, the Warring States of China implemented parallel self-strengthening reforms designed to increase their military competitiveness vis-à-vis their rivals. In the fourth and third centuries BCE, the state of Qin went the farthest by breaking the power of hereditary nobles, re-organizing its entire territory into 31 uniform conscription districts (xian), creating a pathway grid across the country, ranking the entire population in 18 grades and dividing it into groups of five and ten for collective surveillance and liability, instituting rewards for military prowess, imposing codified penal law, and standardizing currency, weights, and measures. These reforms, however imperfect they may have been in practice, went some way in creating a homogeneous territorial state, sought to extend state control across all levels of society, concentrated power in the hands of the king, raised both the power of the state and the autonomy of the central government to unprecedented levels, and reputedly enabled Qin to mobilize and deploy military and corvee work forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands. In forthcoming work, Dingxin Zhao argues that this development was ultimately a function of prolonged inconclusive warfare between fairly evenly matched competitors, an environment in which only intensification could produce decisive outcomes.
7 When the state of Qin finally absorbed its six rivals in the 230s and 220s BCE, the regime of the First Emperor attempted to impose and perpetuate this system across China. In the novel absence of the centripetal force of interstate competition, this endeavor triggered resistance that rapidly overthrew the Qin regime and led to a re-assertion of regional forces that underwrote the establishment of the Han monarchy. It took the new dynasty at least half a century to curtail regional and aristocratic autonomy, a process that was aided by conflict with the Xiongnu, confirming the principle that war-making precipitates state-making. After the temporary collapse of the Han dynasty during the Wang Mang usurpation in the early first century CE and ensuing civil war, the clock was once again set back 200 years, restoring much power to regional cliques and magnates. In the end, the growing power of provincial gentry and commanders-turned-warlords conspired to undermine and finally eliminate the central government in the late second and early third centuries CE. 8 In the last three centuries BCE, Rome accomplished conquests on the same scale as Qin but without comparable intensification of government. In both cases, however, successful expansion was made possible by mass conscription of peasants. In the fourth century BCE, when Rome faced competitors of comparable strength and military organization within the Italian peninsula, it introduced a series of self-strengthening reforms that echoed many of Qin's reforms in the same period, albeit usually in a more muted fashion: the introduction of direct taxation to fund war-making (tributum); the strengthening of the peasantry by abolishing debt-bondage; the expansion of conscription across the entire citizenry; periodic registration of adult men; the creation of 35 conscription districts (tribus), functionally at least in some ways comparable to the 31 xian of Qin; land grants to soldiers drawing on annexed territories; and political reform to accommodate social mobility at the elite level.
9 Beginning in 295 BCE, and certainly after 202 BCE, Rome did not normally face state-level competitors with matching mobilization potentials. This, and the consequent absence of prolonged inconclusive warfare against other states, obviated the need for farther-reaching domestic reforms promoting centralization and bureaucratization. In other words, the benefits of asymmetric warfare (against states that relied more on mercenaries in the eastern and southern Mediterranean and against less complex chiefdoms and tribes in the northern and western periphery) enabled Rome to succeed with less domestic restructuring than was required in the intensely competitive environment of Warring States China.
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Moreover, proto-bureaucratization was logically incompatible with the governmental arrangements of the Roman Republic, which was controlled by a small number of aristocratic lineages that relied on social capital, patronage relationships, and the manipulation of ritual performances to maintain power, and more mundanely drew on their own friends, clients, slaves, and freedmen to fulfill key administrative tasks.
11 Tightly regimented popular political participation provided a benign arbitration device equivalent to the services that in more conventionally organized states would have been provided by a weak monarch. Financial management, which required a greater concentration of human capital, was largely farmed out to private contractors. In this context, the army was the only institution that attained a certain level of professionalization. This, in turn, laid the groundwork for the increasing autonomy of military power near the end of the Republic, which facilitated warlordism and the creation of a military monarchy.
In terms of Michael Mann's distinction of the four main sources of social power, 12 the oligarchic regime of the Roman conquest state was maintained as long as political, military, and ideological power were closely tied together and controlled by the same aristocratic collective. Once military power broke free from political and ideological constraints, the rule of the collective was replaced by warlords and monarchs who came to rely on a fully professionalized army and managed political power through the traditional mechanisms of patronage and patrimonialism. The main difference to China is that in China, military power was mostly (though by no means always) successfully contained and for long periods even marginalized by political-ideological power. The near-perfect Han fusion of political and ideological power was a function of the centralizing reforms of the Warring States period and the subsequent adoption of a hybrid Confucian-Legalist belief system that reinforced state authority.
13 Except in the early city-state phase of the Roman polity, Roman regimes never benefited from a comparably close linkage of political and ideological power. Economic power was arguably less constrained in the West than in China, which allowed the Qin and Han states to aim for greater interference in economic affairs, an approach that the Roman state only belatedly adopted from the late third century CE onwards.
Over time, both systems experienced what one might call a 'normalization' of the degree of state control, in the sense of a regression to the mean, the mean being defined as the range of conditions observed in most premodern imperial states. In a manner of speaking, Warring States Qin and Republican Rome started out at opposite ends of the spectrum: Qin was unusually centralized and bureaucratized whereas Rome was run by a collective and greatly depended on private administrative resources. These dramatic differences may have affected the differential pace of conquest but did not impact ultimate outcomes, that is, eventual domination of the entire ecumene. Over time, both political systems converged, a process that began around 200 BCE in China and in the late first century BCE in Rome. It is the mature Roman empire of the fourth century CE that most resembles the Han empire in institutional as well as practical terms.
14 Both empires were divided into around 100 provinces with separate civilian and military leadership that were in turn supervised by about a dozen inspectors ('vicars' and 'shepherds', respectively); the central administration was organized around a number of ministries (the praefectus praetorio, magister officiorum, praepositus sacri cubiculi, and magister militum in Rome, the 'Three Excellencies' and 'Nine Ministers' in China); the 'inner' court and its agents, including eunuchs, had gradually gained influence relative to formal state institutions, while the emperors became increasingly sequestered. Even child emperors managed by powerful regents, who had long been common in China but rare in Rome, eventually appeared in the later Roman empire.
In the final analysis, the major differences in political and administrative organization between Rome and China can be explained in terms of the initial difference in regime type: in the case of Rome, collective aristocratic rule accounted for an early reluctance to annex, for the lack of bureaucracy not just during the Republic but also for the first three centuries of the monarchy, and for the continuing use of aristocrats as delegates of the ruler and his military commanders for the same 300-year period. In China, by contrast, centralization, the creation of territorial states, and the disempowerment of aristocrats facilitated rapid annexation and bureaucratic expansion. A second variable, the nature of interstate conflict, mediated political structure, as the shift to 'asymmetric' conflict may have helped extend the shelf-life of Roman oligarchy whereas prolonged inconclusive 'symmetric' warfare in China rewarded centralization and concentration of power.
15 But this is not to say that oligarchic traditions continued to constrain Roman state formation indefinitely. As soon as an impetus for reform had been provided by the military and political crisis of the mid-third century century CE, Roman state institutions rapidly converged with those of the Han state: a strong numerical expansion of the bureaucracy, homogenization of registration and taxation, the separation of military and civilian administration, the creation of formal hierarchies and spheres of competence in administration, and the severing of traditional ties between the ruler and his court on the one hand and the capital and its hinterland on the other. 16 The common notion that early imperial China was considerably more bureaucratized than the Roman empire inflates actual differences. First of all, the number of senior positions was essentially the same in both states, a few hundred in each case. Second, even before the reforms in late antiquity did Roman governors draw on the services of thousands of seconded soldiers as well as their own slaves and freedmen while the familia Caesaris, the patrimonial staff of the emperors, must have contained thousands of slaves and ex-slaves. By 400 CE, the Roman state employed over 30,000 civilian officials, compared to around four times as many in Western Han China. 17 The principal shift between the early and the later monarchical state in Rome was from the ad hoc use of soldiers and the intense patrimonialism of relying on slaves and ex-slaves to the use of a salaried civilian workforce. The most significant differences between Rome and China were retained at the city level. For instance, Han cities did not feature self-governing city councils or elections. Moreover, a recently discovered provincial archive from the end of the Western Han period shows that just as in later and better documented periods of Chinese history, even low-level government officials were recruited from outside the province they served in. 18 Thus, while many of the 100,000-odd provincial administrators and clerks on the Han government payroll may well have come from a similar (local elite or 'gentry') background as the more than 100,000 men who populated the city councils of the Roman empire, the two groups operated in rather different social contexts, as leaders of their own communities in the latter case and as more detached state agents in the former. Moreover, Roman cities relied more heavily on public slaves than on salaried officials. 19 Only very late were Roman cities assigned an external curator rei publicae or defensor civitatis.
20 Even so, we may wonder if ultimate outcomes differed greatly: shielding of resources by local elites in the Roman empire and rent-seeking by imported Han officials would both have interfered with revenue collection on behalf of the state. It would be unwise to overestimate the meritocratic dimension of early Chinese officialdom: most Han state agents obtained office via recommendation, i.e. through straightforward patronage, just as in Rome; others bought offices, as in the later Roman empire. 21 In quantitative terms, Han entry 15 In the case of Rome, the main counterfactual outcomes would have been a shift to monocracy in response to greater-than-historical interstate competition (a scenario made plausible by the well-attested tendency to prolong and expand individual commands in times of crisis) or state failure if oligarchic institutions had proven too resilient. Real-life analogies to the latter outcome are furnished by early Chinese states that failed to curtail aristocratic power. examinations were a fringe phenomenon, producing only a relatively small number of graduates each year, and even in Rome, where formal credentialing remained unknown, certain kinds of officials came to benefit from having studied law.
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In the end, even the vaunted separation of military and civilian administration in China and the containment of military power by political-ideological power failed quite spectacularly. It is true that in Rome, military power had long been more autonomous than in China; yet by the late second century CE China was rapidly catching up with and soon surpassing corrosive Roman habits, and likewise began to suffer at the hands of military pretenders and usurpers. In both cases, moreover, we observe infiltration by 'barbarian' settlers, Xiongnu, Xianbei, and Qiang in China, Goths, Burgundians and others in the West, groups that nominally accepted imperial rule but increasingly exercised political autonomy. 23 In both cases, the introduction of this element perturbed the extractive-coercive equilibrium between local elites and the central government, eroded the state's monopoly on the sale of protection, interfered with revenue collection, and ultimately prompted bargains between local elites and barbarians that undermined central government. In the ensuing successor states in both East and West, foreign conquerors and indigenes were initially kept apart and subject to separate registration procedures, the former as warriors, the latter as producers of extractable surplus. In both cases, these barriers eroded over time, and we witness a synthesis of foreign and local elites.
24

Divergence
Trajectories of state formation signally diverged from the sixth century CE onward. 25 At that time, Justinian's attempted re-unification of the original Roman empire was only partially successful, and the following century witnessed the diminution of the East Roman state at the hands of Persians, Avars, and most importantly Arabs. Hamstrung by the autonomy of their regional armies, the Arab conquerors were unable to establish a durable ecumenical empire.
26 After the failure of Charlemagne's imperial revival, political fragmentation throughout western Eurasia intensified during the late first millennium CE, most notably in Christian Europe, where states lost the ability to control and tax populations and sovereignty de facto came to be shared among monarchs, lords, local strongmen, semi-independent towns, and clergy. The (re-)creation of centralized states was a drawn-out process that primarily unfolded during the first half of the second millennium CE but in some cases took even longer, resulting in a cluster of polities in which balancing mechanisms prevented the creation of a core-wide empire. 27 Instead, intense interstate competition, internal social and intellectual upheavals, the creation of new kinds of maritime empire, and (eventually) technological progress, gave rise to the modern nation state in the eighteenth (or perhaps only nineteenth) century. In sixth-century CE China, by contrast, imperial re-unification restored the bureaucratic state that largely succeeded, albeit with substantial interruptions, in maintaining a core-wide empire under Chinese or foreign leadership until 1911 and, in effect, up to the present day.
to meritocracy, also favored recruitment of the propertied for governmental service. This suggests that the distinction between Rome as an empire run by an elite of property-owners and China as an empire of officeholders (Wood 2003: 26-32) is overdrawn. 22 Bielenstein 1980: 138-41; Ausbüttel 1998: 178-9. 23 de Crespigny 1984; Wolfram 1997; Heather 2006; Goffart 2006. 24 Why did this happen? In principle, a whole variety of factors may have been relevant. For instance, the larger size of the western ecumene was more conducive to fragmentation: China lacked state-level competitors of the caliber of the Persians and Arabs. Climatic change in the second half of the first millennium CE may have benefited northern China more than Europe. The Sino-'barbarian' successor states were more adept at containing movement in the steppe, whereas European regimes were vulnerable to Avars, Slavs, Bulgarians, Magyars, and Vikings. China was spared the 200 years of recurrent plague that ravaged the early medieval West. 28 The contribution of ideological power also requires consideration. The Sinological tradition habitually emphasizes the long-term impact of Confucian elite traditions (or rather of the Confucian-Legalist version that had been created in the Western Han period) which favored the notion of a well-ordered unified state managed by scholarly civilian bureaucrats. However, the significance of ideational forces has to evaluated in a comparative context: in this case, we must give due weight to the comparative lack of substantive political impact of ideological commitments to Christian unity in the post-Roman west, of attempts to harness the notion of 'eternal Rome' for empire-building (as in the case of Charlemagne and the Ottonians), and of the Islamic ideal of the unity of the umma. Moreover, the post-Han period in China was characterized by increased competition between rival belief systems, such as Daoism and Buddhism. The temporary efflorescence of Buddhist monasteries in the Northern Wei period even suggests a measure of convergence between developments in early medieval China and late Roman and postRoman Europe, where the clerical establishment accumulated vast resources, eclipsed the state in its access to human capital, and eventually came to share in its sovereignty. 29 Nevertheless, it is true that Confucian scholars provided a suitable instrument of state management, whereas the absence of an equivalent group in the Christian west may have made it more difficult for post-Roman regimes to maintain or restore a 'strong' state: the intrinsically autonomous and schismatically riven Christian churches that had evolved outside and in some sense in opposition to the imperial state could not offer comparable services. Abiding frictions between political and ideological power in the post-Roman world may have impeded the strengthening of state capacity and thus successful empire-building.
However, while state capabilities would necessarily have been influenced by these and other contextual features, causal analysis ought to focus more narrowly on the ways in which differences in state-society relations shaped trends in overall state formation. Chris Wickham has proposed an explanatory model of proximate causation for large parts of post-ancient western Eurasia that can also be used to shed light on contrasting developments in East Asia. 30 In brief, the 'strong' Roman state (which counted and taxed a demilitarized population in order to support a large standing army) was succeeded in part by states that maintained systems of taxation and salaried military forces (the East Roman and Arab states) and in part by weak or weakening states whose rulers gradually lost the ability to count and tax their subjects (the Germanic successor states in the west), while in some marginal areas, state institutions collapsed altogether (such as in Britain). In 'strong' states with registration, taxation, and centrally controlled military forces, rulers enjoyed greater autonomy from elite interests, and elites relied to a significant degree on the state (for offices, salaries, and other perquisites) to maintain their status. In 'weak' states, elites relied more on the resources they themselves controlled and enjoyed greater autonomy from rulers. In the absence of centralized tax collection and coercive capabilities, the power of rulers depended largely on elite cooperation secured by bargaining processes. From the perspective of the general population, local elites rather than state rulers and their agents dominated, and feudal relationships were a likely outcome. At the same time, in the absence of the kind of trans-regional integration that is characteristic of 'strong' states, elites tended to be less disproportionally wealthy. These conditions had profound consequences for economic performance, eroding interregional exchange in and among 'weak' states. Over time, even the relatively 'strong' post-Roman successor states experienced a decline of state taxation and salaried military forces, most notably in seventh-and eight-century Byzantium. The Umayyad empire also suffered from the regionalization of revenue collection and military power. 31 In this context of fiscal decline and decentralization of political and military power, it became more difficult to maintain state capabilities (especially in the military sphere) and the prospects for the creation of very large stable empires were poor.
In terms of state capacity, developments in early medieval China differed quite dramatically from conditions in much of western Eurasia. The late fifth and sixth centuries CE in particular witnessed the gradual restoration of Han-style governmental institutions that enabled rulers to count and tax a growing proportion of their subjects, curb elite autonomy, and mobilize ever-larger resources for military efforts that eventually resulted in imperial re-unification. 32 Serious challenges to recentralization, such as intense conflict between rival nomadic groups and the emergence of large numbers of fortified settlements that were organized around clans and village units and designed to protect (and hence secure local control over) the agricultural population, were eventually contained: in consequence, radically different outcomes were avoided, such as feudalization and long-term fragmentation across China, a real-life counterfactual that had indeed already materialized on a previous occasion, back in the early Spring and Autumn period in the eighth century BCE. 33 This raises the question of why the foreign conquest elites succeeded in shoring up state capabilities where their western counterparts failed. The nature of antecedent governmental institutions and differences in the compensation of military forces (most notably allocation of goods versus assignment of land) and their organization (a predominance of cavalry or infantry) may all have played a critical role. All these issues call for further investigation. A comparative perspective will be essential in identifying factors that precipitated dramatically different long-term outcomes in east and west: the famous 'dynastic cycle' in China and the resilient polycentrism of the medieval and modern European state system.
